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GOVERNING FROM THE MARGINS: THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
DOCTRINE AS A TOOL OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Simon Paul*
Summary: The European Court of Human Rights’ margin of apprecia-
tion doctrine is of growing importance in general international law. 
Existing scholarship, however, fails to consider the political stakes 
involved in its use. The aim of this paper is to offer a reconceptualisa-
tion of the margin as a tool of global governance in the context of the 
increasing judicialisation of human rights protection in Europe. It then 
proposes four sketches of its possible governance effects, situating it 
within broader debates concerning competing models of internation-
al constitutionalisation, the Court’s unarticulated discrimination be-
tween different European States, and the challenges the Court faces 
in maximising compliance with its judgments. The paper concludes 
by arguing that the Court’s use of the margin as an ‘escape valve’ to 
avoid potentially controversial proportionality assessments poses a 
challenge to its long-term legitimacy, and involves a kind of ‘bad faith’ 
exercise of its governance power.
1 Introduction
On the website of the Council of Europe can be found a mysterious 
document entitled ‘The Margin of Appreciation’.1 Over several pages, the 
document provides an outline of a legal doctrine used by the European 
Court of Human Rights, with sections entitled ‘Interpretive Principles’, 
‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Jurisprudence of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights’, and a final section providing ‘Conclu-
sions’. The mystery arises from the apparent absence of an author: one 
has to peer very closely at the end of the text, after the bibliography, to 
discover that it is credited to the ‘Romanian team of the National Institute 
of Magistracy’. This reduction of the author’s presence is all the more 
striking when one casts a critical eye over the contents of the document. 
It references many of the leading scholarly works concerning the margin 
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of appreciation, a body of scholarship rich in disagreement. Yet the tone 
of the document itself is clear: as the margin of appreciation is an ‘inher-
ent and permanent phenomenon under the Convention’ there must exist 
‘principled criteria’ for its application, and the purpose of the study is to 
‘identify and explain them’.2 
Are we to take this as a statement of the settled view of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights as to the margin of appreciation, perhaps 
as an expression of its self-image? Its presence on the Council of Eu-
rope website, and the authorless quality of it, suggests we might. Yet a 
closer look reveals that, if this is a self-image, then it is a confused one. 
For in the same paragraph that the document asserts the ‘inherent and 
permanent’ nature of the margin of appreciation, there also sits another 
claim. That the ‘process of realizing a “uniform standard” of human rights 
protection  must be gradual because the entire legal framework rests on 
the fragile foundations of the Member States’ (emphasis added). Thus, in 
a single paragraph, we have an unfolding process, an identifiable mis-
sion, alongside an ‘inherent and permanent phenomenon’ that seems at 
odds with that goal. The juxtaposition of these two statements suggests 
a nightmarish image: of an institution with a clear destination, which it 
is condemned never to reach, like a boat propelled by oarsmen rowing in 
opposite directions. 
But perhaps the document is not supposed to represent the views of 
the Court at all. It is, after all, found on the website of the Council of Eu-
rope, a body composed of the states who appear as litigants in the Court, 
and whose victories routinely depend on the margin of appreciation. Yet 
this understanding might lead us to treat with suspicion its claims of 
‘permanence’ and ‘inherency’, and also the search for ‘principled criteria’. 
For, as the document itself concedes (again, in the same paragraph), the 
margin of appreciation gives the Court the ‘flexibility’ to avoid ‘damag-
ing confrontations’ between it and the Member States. A sceptical reader 
might question whether this doctrine avoids damaging confrontations, 
or merely settles them in favour of the State. We might also question 
whether the search for a principled basis is fundamentally at odds with 
the demand for flexibility, and whether the claims made in the document 
are as uncontroversial as its authorless quality suggests, or in fact repre-
sent the victory of one oarsman in this never-ending struggle. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the margin of appreciation 
in light of this institutional conflict. It will be suggested that the margin 
of appreciation can be seen as a symptom of the governance dilemma 
that arises from two different sets of commitments inherent in the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights: its foundation in a treaty-based system, 
2 ibid.
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reflecting public international law’s regard for sovereign States, and the 
transnational universalism of human rights. The aim will be to suggest 
that whilst the margin of appreciation is not ‘inherent’, this conflict is. 
The margin itself as a solution to that conflict is contingent, yet over time 
it has acquired the aura of necessity. This paper seeks to diminish, or 
at least question, that aura, by considering the governance effects of the 
margin of appreciation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, a brief introduc-
tion to the doctrine will be offered, followed by an assessment of the 
current state of scholarship. This suggests that there is a lacuna in the 
scholarly work: whilst many theorists seek to defend or critique the mar-
gin of appreciation, there has been no attempt to assess its governance 
effects. Then some of the key justifications for the doctrine, and attempts 
to found it on a ‘principled basis’, will be considered. It will be argued that 
the common justifications fail to provide such a principled basis, and as 
such a reconceptualisation of the doctrine as a ‘tool’ will be suggested. 
This leads to the further question: what, or whom, is it a tool for? What 
are the political stakes involved in the use of the margin of appreciation? 
Who wins, and who loses, by the existence of this judicial tool? 
The remainder of the paper attempts to answer this, by offering four 
sketches of the effects of the margin of appreciation reconceptualised as 
a governance tool. None of these are supposed to be conclusive, but all, it 
is hoped, will suggest ways of thinking about the margin of appreciation 
that might lead to a different assessment of it. The first sketch argues 
that the margin of appreciation can be seen as taking a stake in the clash 
between two different visions of international constitutionalisation: the 
post-statist model, and the traditional nation-state trajectory. It will be 
argued that the margin of appreciation reverts constitutionalising capac-
ity back to the nation-state, aiding in the capture of the processes of 
constitutionalisation by public institutions using human rights norms. 
The second sketch views the margin of appreciation as an aspect of the 
Court’s unarticulated discrimination between Member States, arguing 
that its inconsistent use vis-à-vis different States reflects the tension be-
tween the teleology of human rights and the regard for the sovereignty 
of its members arising from the treaty-based system. The third sketch 
situates the margin of appreciation in the context of the Court’s challenge 
of ensuring compliance with its judgments. It suggests that the margin 
of appreciation, somewhat counter-intuitively, is used by the Court as a 
way of avoiding issuing costly judgments against States, so as to build up 
compliance respect that it can later cash in, aiding the steady expansion 
of its governance power. 
The final section considers the relationship between the margin of 
appreciation, proportionality and balancing of rights. It argues that the 
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margin of appreciation enables the Court to give the impression of avoid-
ing taking a stake in issues of conflict and distribution. Yet, the analysis 
suggests, this is a false impression, as when the Court deploys the mar-
gin it cannot help taking such a stake. It is then argued that this suggests 
a problem for the Court’s legitimacy and effectiveness, and that a better 
approach might be for the Court to rely more on its own assessments of 
proportionality and balancing of interests. An understanding of the politi-
cal stakes involved in such a development would require a more complete 
theory of the ‘politics of separation of powers’, considered in the context 
of an inter-governmental human rights court. Various avenues for future 
research are suggested. 
The paper finishes by concluding that, although the margin of ap-
preciation is here to stay, it is by no means ‘inherent’ or ‘permanent’, but 
is the result of specific doctrinal choices, which represent the victory of 
one aspect of the Court’s identity over another. Although the two oars-
men of universalist human rights and statism are in a constant struggle, 
the paper seeks to show that the margin of appreciation cannot provide 
a solution to that problem. It is a symptom of it, and to pretend that it 
is necessary is to mask the political stakes that accompany the use of 
such a tool, and disguise alternative paths for European governance that 
might handle those stakes differently.
2. The margin of appreciation: flexible tool or principled basis?
2.1 Origins and current scholarship
The margin of appreciation refers to the latitude the European Court 
of Human Rights sometimes gives to national authorities, whether legis-
lative, administrative or judicial, in implementing the human rights guar-
antees under the European Convention. It first appeared in the Court’s 
judgments in the context of article 15, which enables States to derogate 
from their duties under the Convention in times of ‘war, or other pub-
lic emergency threatening the life of the nation’.3 The State was granted 
a ‘certain margin of appreciation’ in determining whether such circum-
stances had arisen.4 The genealogy of the doctrine can be traced through 
martial law, and the jurisprudence of the French Conseil d’État, and oth-
er continental administrative review bodies.5 In a series of judgments, 
beginning with Handyside v United Kingdom in 1976, the Court extended 
3 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art 15 
(adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) UNTS 221. 
4 Greece v United Kingdom App no 176/56 (European Commission of Human Rights, 
1958) para 136. 
5 Howard C Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Hu-
man Rights Jurisprudence (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996). 
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the use of the doctrine to the ‘personal freedoms’ of articles 8-11.6 It has 
since become a central feature of the Court’s jurisprudence, and poten-
tially applicable to any claim. 
The concept is also gaining traction beyond the European Court of 
Human Rights. It has been suggested that it should be adopted by ICSID 
Tribunals as an all-purpose standard of review in investor-state claims7 
and as a general principle of international law that should be recognised 
by the ICJ.8 It has also found its way into the jurisprudence of other 
international human rights mechanisms, where the United Nations Hu-
man Rights Committee has employed it implicitly, and the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights expressly referred to the judgments of the 
European Court in using it.9 At the same time, the concept has started 
to appear in the judgments of the Court of the Justice of the European 
Union, albeit in limited circumstances (and it is often referred to as an 
‘area of discretion’ instead).10 
The margin of appreciation thus has significance beyond the peculi-
arities of the European Convention system. However, since its inception 
it has been one of the most controversial aspects of the Court’s jurispru-
dence, and has generated much scholarship.11 One recent monograph 
seeks to defend the margin as a judicial doctrine, by building on some of 
the justifications hinted at in the judgments, and using insights from the 
philosophy of practical reason to argue that it is a ‘second-order reason’ 
that the Court can take into account when deciding cases.12 Likewise, 
other contemporary theorists seek to cast the doctrine in its best light, by 
distinguishing between the different ways it is used by the Court, and of-
fering normative arguments to support these different uses.13 At the same 
6 Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, paras 47-49.
7 William W Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Sphere’ 
(2010) 35 Yale J Intl L 283.
8 Yuval Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ 
(2005) 16 European J Intl L 907.
9 Ondir Bakircioglu, ‘The Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Freedom of 
Expression and Public Morality Cases’ (2007) 8 German L J 711, 713.
10 James A Sweeney, ‘A “Margin of Appreciation” in the Internal Market: Lessons from the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 34 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 27, 33. 
11 The canonical works are Yourow (n 5), and Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Ap-
preciation Doctrine and the Principal of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR 
(Intersentia 2002). 
12 Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law (OUP 2012). 
Legg argues that the margin of appreciation is a judicial practice of assigning weight to a 
respondent State’s reasoning in a case based on three factors: democratic legitimacy, com-
mon practice of states, and expertise. 
13 See George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Jour-
nal of Legal Studies 705, 706, for an attempt to distinguish between two ways the Court 
uses the margin: a ‘substantive’ use, whereby it is used to address the relationship between 
individual freedom and collective goals, and a ‘structural’ use, where the margin of ap-
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time, critique has tended to centre on the abstract theoretical inconsist-
ency between the universalism of human rights and the accommodation 
of national differences, or the challenge to the rule of law posed by the ad 
hoc use of the doctrine.14
This paper differs, in that it seeks to move the debate away from 
a purely doctrinal or theoretical critique, by viewing the margin of ap-
preciation as the expression of a governance dilemma, arising from the 
challenge of judicialising the project of international human rights via a 
treaty-based system. As such, it is presumed that the margin of apprecia-
tion not only has specific governance effects that are worth studying in 
their own right, but that its close relationship to the fundamental institu-
tional conflict at the heart of the European Court makes it a useful prism 
through which to assess the Court’s activities as a whole. This paper, 
then, seeks to contribute to three broad areas of literature. First, work in 
global governance seeking to position institutions such as the European 
Court of Human Rights within the discourse.15  Second, specific doctri-
nal debates concerning the status of the margin of appreciation in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.16 Third, work in 
the new field of critical approaches to human rights, which seeks to treat 
human rights as an intellectual and practical project of governance that 
can and ought to be critiqued in politically contestable terms.17
preciation involves addressing the limits or intensity of review of the Court arising from its 
basis as an international tribunal. 
14 See, for example, CS Feingold, ‘The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (1977) 53 Notre Dame Law 90; Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Derogations 
under Human Rights Treaties’ (1978) 48 British Yearbook of International Law 281, 296-
315; Anthony Lester, ‘Universality versus Subsidiarity: A Reply’ (1998) 1 European Human 
Rights Law Review 73; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal 
Standards’ (1998) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 843; 
and Douglas Lee Donoho, ‘Autonomy, Self-Governance and the Margin of Appreciation’ 
(2001) 15 Emory Intl L Rev 391. Jeffrey A Brauch, ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: A Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2005) 
11 Columbia J Intl L 113, argues that the lack of clear principles governing the use of the 
margin pose a threat to the rule of law. It is worth noting that wholesale calls for the removal 
of the doctrine have receded in the critical literature, and instead attempts to reconstruct 
and defend dominate.  
15 See David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ (2008) 34 Ohio Northern Uni-
versity L Rev 827; and Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling The World: 
International Constitutionalism And Global Governance (CUP 2009). It is, of course, an open 
question whether the Court can be regarded as an institution of global governance as such; 
see, for example, James W Nickel, ‘Is Today’s International Human Rights System a Global 
Governance Regime?’ (2002) 6 The Journal of Ethics 353, for the argument that it is not. 
However, for the purposes of this paper it matters little whether the label of global govern-
ance is correctly applied. What matters is, as will hopefully be shown, that doctrines such 
as the margin of appreciation have transnational governance effects, at the very least in the 
European constitutional space. 
16 See nn 9-11. 
17 This field can be traced to an article by David Kennedy, ‘The International Human Rights 
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That said, before moving to consider the governance effects of the 
margin of appreciation, it is important to understand why its charac-
terisation as a ‘tool’ rather than a doctrine per se is apt.18 Of course, to a 
large extent the difference between legal doctrines and tools is rhetorical. 
All doctrines contain gaps and ambiguities that are susceptible to critical 
attack, and some of the most enduring judicial tropes (say, ‘reasonable-
ness’ standards) sit far along the spectrum of vagueness. Yet the rhetori-
cal difference is an important one. ‘Doctrine’ suggests that the particular 
legal device in question has a coherence and completeness that justifies 
its enduring presence in judgments. It suggests that practitioners will be 
able to orient themselves around it, that its use is neither arbitrary nor 
unpredictable, and that the reasons given for deploying the doctrine are 
those that really motivated its use.19 ‘Tool’, on the other hand, suggests 
that the legal device is being used to fulfil some function in addition to 
the reasons given for it in the text of the judgment.20 It invites a sceptical 
Movement: Part of the Problem?’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 101. See R 
Dickinson and others (eds) Examining Critical Perspectives on Human Rights (CUP 2014) for 
an updated article by Kennedy with responses, and in particular, Stephen Wheatley, ‘The 
Construction of the Constitutional Essentials of Democratic Politics by the European Court 
of Human Rights following Sejdic and Finci’ (ibid) for the argument that the European Court 
of Human Rights exercises a strong governance function when it elaborates the scope and 
content of ECHR obligations (Wheatley’s striking example is the case of Sejdic and Finci 
where the Court held that a provision of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitution was incom-
patible with art 14 of the Convention). In JM Beneto and D Kennedy (eds), New Approaches 
to International Law (TMC Asser Press 2013), Frédéric Mégret offers an overview of the cur-
rent status of the critique of international human rights, in his contribution, ‘Where Does 
the Critique of International Human Rights Stand? An Exploration in 18 Vignettes’ (ibid, 3). 
18 However, even defenders of the margin suggest this distinction is important. For exam-
ple, Legg (n 12) 13, devotes part of his monograph to arguing that the margin of apprecia-
tion (and deference more generally) ought to be regarded as doctrines, in the same way that 
‘fair, just and reasonable’ in the context of English tort law is – as both provide an ‘amor-
phous set of standards’.  
19 This distinction naturally embodies legal scepticism that is familiar from legal realist 
and critical legal studies modes of analysis. However, for the purposes of this paper it is 
unnecessary to accept the theoretical assumptions of these discourses at large. No position 
is being taken on the question of whether all legal doctrines are best explained by looking 
for an ideological or sociological explanation. Instead, regardless of what position one takes 
on these fundamental questions, the suggestion is merely that the margin of appreciation is 
used in a way that lends itself to particular scepticism, and that this in turn reveals some-
thing interesting about the conflicting strands of the Court’s institutional identity.   
20 The application of the concept of a tool to the margin of appreciation is not entirely novel, 
nor is the extent of my critique of the justifications given for it. It was described by Judge 
Malinverni in Lautsi v Italy as a ‘a tool that needs to be handled with care’ (see Lautsi v Italy 
(2011) 54 EHRR 3 (GC), dissenting opinion of Judge Malinverni, joined by Judge Kalaydjieva 
on page 1, quoted in Dean Spielmann, ‘Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of 
Human Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of 
European Review?’ (2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 381, 383). It 
has been argued that it is a ‘practical tool enabling the Court to evade its responsibilities’ 
(Paul Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’ (1998) 
19 Human Rights Law Journal 1), and leading practitioners at the Court have criticised its 
unpredictability, lack of legal certainty and potential for abuse (see Lester (n 14)). 
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inquiry into the politics of its varied uses, as it invites such scepticism 
even from those for whom such critiques are exceptional. The position-
ing of the margin of appreciation as a canon of the Court’s interpretive 
techniques is all the more striking when one considers that some of the 
most vehement objections have come from the bench itself.21 What is the 
origin of this opposition? The following section provides three bases on 
which the reasons given for justifying the use of the margin are invariably 
unsatisfying, for want of clarity. The aim is to suggest that opposition to 
the margin of appreciation need not be ideologically motivated, but can 
arise from frustration with the paucity of reasoning employed in its use, 
and the subsequent costs this may impose on legal certainty and the 
Court’s legitimacy.
2.2  Three flexible uses: inconsistent use of state practice, natural 
kind reasoning and ad hoc reliance on expertise
This part of the paper proposes three aspects of the Court’s use of 
the margin of appreciation that suggest it is being used more as a ‘flexible 
tool’ than on a principled basis. All three of these refer to reasons given by 
the Court for setting a wide or narrow margin of appreciation. It is impor-
tant to note that in many cases this is the decisive moment. While there 
are exceptions, the general rule is that when the Court grants the State 
a wide margin, this precedes a ruling in favour of the State. 22 When the 
State is granted a narrow margin, the applicant usually succeeds.23 The 
factors that contribute to the setting of the margin, then, are of crucial 
importance. 
21 See, for example, Judge De Meyer’s dissent in Z v Finland: ‘[it is] high time for the Court 
to banish that concept from its reasoning. It has already delayed too long in abandoning 
this hackneyed phrase and recanting the relativism it implies.... The empty phrases con-
cerning the State’s margin of appreciation... are unnecessary circumlocutions, serving to 
illustrate that States may do anything the Court does not consider incompatible with hu-
man rights’  (Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 371. Spielmann (n 20) 392-394 provides further 
examples of judicial criticism of particular uses of the margin. 
22 See Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41 for an example of a case in which 
the State was granted a wide margin of appreciation, yet the impugned practice was still 
held to have fallen outside ‘any acceptable margin of appreciation’, attracting much criti-
cism. In section 3.2 below, it is suggested that this peculiar use arose from a tension be-
tween the Court’s commitment to recognising consensus and State practice, and its clear 
preference for the practice of certain States that are in greater conformity with its image of 
an ideal liberal democratic society. 
23  See Lautsi v Italy (n 20), dissenting opinion of Judge Malinverni, on page 1, ‘Where 
the court decrees that the margin of appreciation is a narrow one, it will generally find a 
violation of the Convention; where it considers that the margin of appreciation is wide, the 
respondent state will usually be “acquitted”’. This is analogous to the distinction between 
‘rational basis’, ‘strict scrutiny’ and ‘intermediate’ review in US constitutional law. As in the 
case of the margin, it has been argued that these standards of review involve a spectrum. 
See Richard H Fallon Jr, ‘Strict Judicial Scrutiny’ (2007) 54 UCLA L Rev 1267, 1294-96, 
1330-30, for the argument that the strict scrutiny standard involves ‘important commonali-
ties’ with proportionality assessments, such as those used by the European Court.  
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2.2.1 Inconsistent use of State practice: the consensus standard
The most common justification for setting the width of the margin of 
appreciation is the existence or non-existence of consensus among the 
Member States, either as to the relevant importance of the interest at 
stake, or how best to protect it.24 This justification has found support in 
many scholarly defences of the margin, as being necessary in light of the 
treaty-based origins of the Court, and its commitment to interpreting the 
Convention as a ‘living instrument’.25 Whatever normative position one 
takes on this justification, it is clear that it represents a feature of the 
jurisprudence that can lead to a decisive outcome. 
Yet it is striking how little attention is paid in the judgments to this 
profoundly important moment in each case. Whether or not there is suf-
ficient or inconsistent consensus is, according to the Court, the decisive 
moment – as from this follows either a wide (the State wins) or narrow 
(the State loses) margin of appreciation. But despite this, there have been 
no attempts to systematically establish criteria that might aid practition-
ers to determine both when consensus is present, and when consensus 
counts decisively.26 For example, in Dickson v UK, a case concerning the 
compatibility with the Convention of providing artificial insemination fa-
cilities for prisoners, more than half the States allowed the practice, yet 
this was insufficient to make restricting it a breach of the applicant’s 
article 8 rights.27 By contrast, in Hirst (No 2) v United Kingdom, a case 
concerning restrictions on the rights of prisoners to vote in democratic 
elections, seven other States exhibited the same practice as the UK in 
automatically disenfranchising incarcerated prisoners, and eight States 
imposed more extensive restrictions on the rights of prisoners.28 Despite 
this, the Court held that the UK’s practice was a violation of the appli-
24 See Dickson v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 41, para 78: ‘Where, however, there is no consensus 
within the Member States of the Council of Europe either as to the relative importance of 
the interest at stake, or how best to protect it, the margin will be wider. This is particularly 
so, where the case raises complex issues and choices of social strategy: the authorities’ di-
rect knowledge of their society and its needs means that they are in principle better placed 
than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest’. 
25 See Legg (n 11) ch 5, and Yukata Arai-Takahashi, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: 
A Theoretical Analysis of Strasbourg’s Variable Geometry’ in A Follesdal, B Peters and G 
Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, Eu-
ropean and Global Context (CUP 2013). However, see Benvenisti (n 14) for the criticism that 
relying on consensus is illegitimate as it results in a breach of the Court’s duty as a human 
rights organ. 
26 See Brauch (n 14) 135 for the argument that the lack of clarity concerning the European 
consensus standard represents a threat to the rule of law, as it is ‘not an effective predictor 
as to how the court will resolve any particular case’. 
27 Dickson v United Kingdom (n 24). 
28 Hirst (No 2) v United Kingdom (n 22). See section 3.2 ‘The margin of appreciation and the 
Court’s unarticulated discrimination between Member States’, below, for further analysis of 
this case. 
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cant’s rights under article 3 Protocol 1.29 Likewise, in Handyside, the 
Court held that there was no uniform European consensus on morals, 
and therefore the UK’s practice in restricting publication of a book was 
consistent with its Convention obligations, despite the fact that the book 
was freely available across Europe.30 The case law is replete with exam-
ples of the standard being used in ad hoc and sometimes contradictory 
ways, with no explanation of why it is decisive in some cases, and yet is 
not even relied on in others.31
The consensus standard thus fails to provide a principled basis for 
the Court’s use of the margin of appreciation. The Court sometimes anal-
yses systematically the practices of various Member States to support a 
finding of consensus – but on other occasions, it fails to do so, or disre-
gards such findings, even when presented by the applicant. The Court’s 
unwillingness to apply this aspect of the test in a systematic way sug-
gests that the requirement for flexibility is prioritised over the search for 
a principled basis. That the practice of European States via consensus 
could fail to provide such a basis is unsurprising when one considers the 
countervailing claims of human rights, which suggest that the practice of 
some States, those with stronger traditions of respecting human rights, 
must count for more than that of others. This arises from the tension 
at the heart of the European Court, and its twin commitments to the 
ideas of a treaty-based system composed of formally equal States, and 
the transnationalism of human rights, which essentially undercuts this 
equality. As a principled basis for the margin of appreciation, then, the 
consensus standard is unlikely to succeed and its ad hoc use contributes 
to the perception of the margin as a tool, invoked for other reasons than 
the justifications found in the text of the judgments.32 
29 Hirst (No 2) v United Kingdom (n 22) para 41. 
30 Handyside v United Kingdom (n 6) 57.  
31 Brauch (n 14) 145, ‘a “European consensus” provides no predictability for decisions. It 
does not tell individuals or governments when a state action becomes a Convention viola-
tion’. Yourow (n 5) 79 also criticises the consensus standard as failing to offer full reasoning 
for the Court’s determination of the presence or absence of a consensus: ‘The problem with 
the standard, as set out in the opinions, starting with Belgian Linguistics, is that the style 
of sparse opinion writing allows for only a very rare exposition of the components of the 
consensus. The Court, as here, simply states that a consensus of member states national 
law and practice exists, and leaves its conclusion unsupported by discussion, example or 
reference of any kind to any specific national law or practice!’
32 The enlargement of the Convention system and the accession of Eastern European 
States with weaker traditions of human rights protection following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union pose an obvious challenge to this justification for the margin of appreciation that the 
jurisprudence has failed to accommodate in a principled way. See section 3.2 ‘The margin of 
appreciation and the Court’s unarticulated discrimination between Member States’ below. 
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2.2.2 Reliance on natural kind reasoning
The second problematic technique the Court uses to set the margin 
of appreciation may be described as an over-reliance on ‘natural kind’ 
reasoning. This critique is based on an idea found in the philosophy of 
the social sciences.33 ‘Natural kinds’ are concepts that are so basic that 
they correspond straightforwardly with features of the natural world, and 
as such they can be said to ‘carve nature at its joints’.34 The idea is 
that the Court sometimes asserts an analytical category that it argues 
is relevant to the dispute, then claims that that category entails either a 
necessary absence of consensus justifying a wide margin, or a subject-
matter that is best left to the discretion of Member States. Yet the Court 
is being asked to determine whether the specific government act in ques-
tion constitutes an unjustified interference with a Convention right, not 
the relationship between an abstract analytical category and the concept 
of consensus. There is thus a circularity present that suggests an unwill-
ingness to engage in a detailed analysis of the interests at stake. 
For example, in freedom of expression cases, the State often seeks to 
justify its infringement of a right based on the ‘public morals’ exception in 
article 10(2), which permits States to interfere with the right for the ‘pro-
tection of public morals’, to the extent that the interference is ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’.35 Thus the key question the Court is often asked 
to determine is whether the respondent State is justified in invoking the 
public morals exception, or whether the restriction on freedom of expres-
sion is justified for the protection of public morals. 
33 See Jerry A Fodor, ‘Special Sciences: (or: the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypoth-
esis)’ (1974) 28 Synthese 97. 
34 The origins of this phrase date back to Plato in his ‘Phaedrus’ 265e, where in a discus-
sion of systems of classification Socrates says, ‘The second principle is that of division into 
species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a 
bad carver might’ (see Plato, Phaedrus (Robin Waterfield tr, Oxford World’s Classics 2003). 
In Alexander Bird and Emma Tobin, ‘Natural Kinds’ in Edward N Zalta (ed),  The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016), the concept is explained as follows: ‘Mill’s de-
scriptivism implies that for each natural kind term there is an associated set of properties 
such that for some item to be a member of that natural kind, it should possess those prop-
erties – these are properties that describe the kind in question… someone who understands 
the term adequately will grasp a priori that something falls under the kind term if and only 
if it satisfies that description. For example, as mentioned above, Kant held the view that it is 
a priori that something falls under the kind term gold only if it is a yellow metal…’ <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/ebtries/natural-kinds/> accessed 30 May 2016. 
35 European Convention on Human Rights (n 3) art 10(2): ‘The exercise of these freedoms, 
since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, condi-
tions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crimes, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of 
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority or impartiality of the judiciary’. 
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Yet the approach the Court takes is simply to assert that ‘it is not 
possible to find in the domestic law of the Contracting States a uniform 
European conception of morals’, and then to proceed to set a wide mar-
gin of appreciation.36  It thus accepts the States’ assertion of the public 
morals exception as though ‘morality’ were a natural kind, yet without 
conducting any systematic investigation into the actual practices of the 
relevant Member States. The Court simply asserts that the issue is a 
moral one, and then proceeds to state that, because it is a question of 
morality, morality is an area in which there is necessarily no European 
consensus, and thus the margin of appreciation is very wide, and so the 
practice is legitimated. 
This can be contrasted to Dudgeon v United Kingdom, a case con-
cerning the criminalisation of homosexual acts in the UK. Here, the Court 
took the opposite approach, and whilst accepting that the question was 
one of morality, held that there was a European consensus reflecting the 
particular practice of homosexual acts. Likewise, in Dickson, the Court 
asserted the natural kind of a ‘particularly important facet of a person’s 
existence or identity’, and argued that where such a facet is at stake the 
State’s margin of appreciation will be very narrow.37 Yet it is hard to im-
agine, in the context of a breach of a Convention right, a circumstance 
which is not such a particularly important facet. For example, why in 
cases involving derogations on the grounds of national security, where 
the State seeks to justify restrictive measures such as extended deten-
tion without trial periods, is the margin wide, despite the fact that the 
interests in question are undoubtedly important? Surely the very ques-
tion the Court is being asked to determine, in both cases, is the content 
of categories such as ‘public morals’ or ‘particularly important facets of a 
person’s existence or identity’.
The Court’s technique in such cases can be characterised as fol-
lows: the assertion of a vague analytical category, as though it were a 
natural kind, with no attempt to articulate the boundaries of that cate-
gory, accompanied by the assertion that there is a necessary connection 
between that category and the width of the margin, from which flows the 
inevitable result of the case. This again suggests an instance in which 
the margin of appreciation is being wielded as a flexible tool, and as a 
36 Handyside v United Kingdom (n 6) para 48. In this case, this led the Court to find that 
it was within the House of Lords’ margin of appreciation to find that restricting publication 
of the Little Red Book was necessary for the protection of public morals, despite the fact 
that it had already been published in other European States and was freely available across 
Europe. 
37 Dickson v United Kingdom (n 24) para 78: ‘Accordingly, when a particularly important 
facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake (such as the choice to become a ge-
netic parent), the margin of appreciation accorded to a State will in general be restricted’ 
(emphasis added). 
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substitute for detailed reasoning as to the importance of the interests at 
stake.38
2.2.3 Ad hoc reliance on expertise
Another common justification the Court relies on in allowing the 
State a wide margin of appreciation is the superior ‘expertise’ of the na-
tional authorities.39 The idea is that the national authorities, especially in 
circumstances when there is no European consensus (although it is un-
clear how these two ideas are connected) are better placed to assess the 
factual or legal circumstances of the case.40 The Court sometimes uses 
evocative, though opaque, language such as ‘by reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces’, State authorities are ‘in princi-
ple’ better placed than the international judge to give an opinion on the 
exact content of those requirements.41 This principle has a powerful in-
tuitive appeal, and one that has found support from scholars who defend 
the margin of appreciation. Yet, if true, it is not clear what relevance it 
should have to the outcome of a case. For, if true, it is true of every case, 
all of which involve striking a balance between conflicting rights and in-
terests, yet only in some cases is the margin set widely, and only in some 
is the ‘expertise’ argument relied on.
Likewise, the importance of this contact is never explained. If the role 
of the Court included determining factual issues, the superior expertise 
of the national authorities might be more obvious. Yet the Court is an in-
ternational human rights tribunal, and in every case its task is the same: 
it inevitably involves the balancing of different rights, either against one 
another, or some public interest justification. If the national authorities 
are better placed to make such determinations then this would seem to 
deprive the Court of its function – and it is difficult to see why the argu-
ment should apply in some cases, but not in others. 
38 See Section 4 below “Judicial rulership and the politics of separation of powers’ for the 
argument that if the margin is being used as an avoidance mechanism for dealing with a 
particularly controversial question, then such an approach is bound to fail, as when using 
the margin the Court cannot help but take a stake in the substantive conflict and render a 
decision with decisive legal effect in favour of the State practice. 
39 See Legg (n 12) ch 6 for a thorough analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on expertise, 
and an attempt to categorise the different situations in which this is relied on. 
40 See Dickson v United Kingdom (n 12) para 78: ‘This is particularly so where the case 
raises complex issues and choices of social strategy: the authorities’ direct knowledge of 
their society and its needs means that they are in principle better placed than the interna-
tional judge to appreciate what is in the public interest. In such a case, the Court would 
generally respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is “manifestly without a reasonable 
foundation.” There will usually be a wide margin accorded if the State is required to strike 
a competing balance between private and public interests or Convention rights’. 
41 Handyside v United Kingdom (n 6) 48. 
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The absence of deep analysis and ad hoc usage of the expertise jus-
tification again suggest that the margin of appreciation operates more as 
a discretionary tool than a doctrine deployed on a principled basis. Yet 
regarding it as a tool for the Court to ‘evade its responsibilities’ diverts 
attention away from a full consideration of its effects.42 For when the mar-
gin of appreciation is used, it renders the outcome of a case decisively in 
favour of one party, in a manner that can have far-reaching effects within 
the States concerned, leading to changes in legislation, or even constitu-
tional amendments.43 As such, neither the attempt to reify the margin of 
appreciation as a doctrine operating on a principled basis, nor its reduc-
tion to an ad hoc and arbitrary affront to the rule of law, is satisfactory. 
Both approaches seem to ignore the crucial governance effects of the use 
of such a tool. The following sections offer sketches of how we might be-
gin to think about the margin of appreciation in these terms. 
3 Governance effects of the margin of appreciation 
3.1  The politics of the margin of appreciation qua capture of the 
international constitutionalisation process
One way of identifying the political stakes involved in international 
human rights adjudication, and the governance effects of the Court’s use 
of the margin of appreciation, is to situate it in the context of broader de-
bates concerning international constitutionalisation. This section begins 
by setting out this context, identifying the European Court of Human 
Rights as one possible actor among many in a process of generating con-
stitutional norms that have a widespread effect. It is suggested that the 
political stakes in human rights adjudication involve the clash between 
alternative visions of constitutionalisation: the traditional nation-state 
model, and other approaches, such as that of systems theory, which are 
more accommodating of norm generation outside the reach of States. 
These political stakes arise from substantive issues being framed as hu-
man rights issues in the first place. It is argued that a governance effect 
of the margin of appreciation is to take a stake in this conflict, by captur-
ing issues as ‘human rights issues’ and reverting regulatory authority 
back to the State, away from private actors.44 
42 Mahoney (n 20). 
43 Wheatley (n 17) 157-161. 
44 This section can be seen in the context of broader debates concerning the legitima-
cy of public and private models of regulation in global governance, such as, for example, 
Matthias Goldmann, ‘A Matter of Perspective: Global Governance and the Distinction be-
tween Public and Private Authority (and Not Law)’ (25 January 2015) <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2260293> accessed 2 December 2016. For the purposes of this paper, it is not 
necessary to argue in favour of public or private authority per se in global governance. The 
suggestion is merely that such a conflict does exist, and that the margin of appreciation has 
the effect of taking a stake in it.  
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Scholars of international law and global governance have in recent 
years responded to the phenomena of a proliferation of regulation cover-
ing a variety of spheres of activity, and a disaggregation of rule-making 
power among both private and public actors and institutions.45 In Ken-
nedy’s striking phrase, the world is ‘covered in law’, and the task of 
identifying who generates the background rules which structure much 
of modern commercial, social and public activity is an essential step 
in identifying (and thus contesting) how law is used to wield power in 
contemporary global governance.46 The stakes involved in acquiring and 
maintaining such regulatory power, then, are high, and an analysis of 
international human rights adjudication via the European Court must 
be able to situate it within this broader context.47 Whilst the role of 
the European Court in the generation of constitutional norms has been 
considered, this has mainly occurred via an analysis of the Court’s ‘dia-
logue’ with public domestic institutions.48 This paper differs in that it 
seeks to assess the politics of the margin of appreciation in terms of 
45 For example, Martti Koskenniemi argues that existing public international law doctrines 
of treaty interpretation offer the means for resolving clashes of regulatory capacity: see 
‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from Fragmentation and Diver-
sification of International Law’ (18 July 2006, Report of the International Law Commis-
sion, 58th Session 1 May - 9 June and 3 July - 11 August 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/7.702). 
Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan. J Intl L 999 suggest 
that disaggregation and legal pluralism is the inevitable result of an international society or-
ganised into discrete sectors, and offer a sceptical view about the prospect of international 
harmonisation of legal norms. Benedict Kingsbury and others, ‘Forward: Global Govern-
ance as Administration – National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative 
Law’ (2005) 68 Law & Contemporary Problems 1 introduce the prospect of a global adminis-
trative law as resolving the potential legitimacy crisis of disaggregation of regulatory power. 
David Kennedy suggests a focus on the experts who generate these rules, whether in public 
or private institutions, as a means of rediscovering the politics of the ‘background rules’ 
of global governance. See David Kennedy, ‘The Julius Stone Memorial Address 2004 at the 
Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence, University of Sydney: Challenging Expert Rule: The 
Politics of Global Governance’ (2005) 27 Sydney L Rev 5.
46 Kennedy (n 45) 3: ‘In our world, power lies in the capillaries of social and economic life. 
Myriad networks of citizens, commercial interests, civil organisations and government of-
ficials are more significant than interstate diplomacy’.
47 That law can have such a global governance effect can be seen by the renewed focus 
on the European Union’s power to export legal norms around the world. For example, 
Slaughter and Burke-White argue that the EU exerts power over States by offering a new 
model of international norm generation that focuses on a close interaction with the Member 
States, encouraging them to develop domestic law in accordance with ends that are speci-
fied inter-governmentally. See Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, ‘The Future 
of International Law Is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law)’ (2006) 47 Harvard Intl L J 
237. Likewise, Bradford suggests that the EU’s global power is frequently underestimated, 
as its ‘Brussels Effect’ has a strong capacity to force other states to adopt its own regulatory 
standards when entering into trade agreements: see Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ 
(2012) 107 Northwest University L Rev 1. 
48 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 Virginia J Intl L 1103 for an 
example. 
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broader processes of constitutionalisation among both private and pub-
lic actors. 
One way of understanding this potential clash is by assessing the 
role of the European Court in light of what might be termed ‘post-statist’ 
models of international constitutionalism, of which Teubner’s ‘societal 
constitutionalism’ and ‘systems theory’ offer a prominent example.49 Un-
der these models, international society can be seen as divided into a dis-
crete set of functionally differentiated autonomous social systems, which 
compete to occupy the same regulatory space, in a process occurring 
both inside and outside the context of the nation-state.50  As such, it is 
easy to see how the European Court of Human Rights clashes with such 
a model. It is closely aligned with the traditional trajectory for developing 
constitutional norms, via the public institutions of its Member States. 
But there is no reason a priori why the emerging constitutional norms of 
this trend of constitutionalisation ought to be generated by this trajec-
tory of domestic legislature, domestic court, and international human 
rights court.51 Indeed, this would involve normative assumptions about 
the function of the nation-state that ought not to be conceptualised as 
somehow logically connected with the process of constitutionalisation. 
Such a model is highly contingent, and carries with it costs and benefits, 
which ought to be assessed as part of understanding the politics of inter-
national human rights adjudication. 
It follows that framing an issue as a human rights issue and bring-
ing it within the scope of the European Court’s jurisdiction can have the 
effect of increasing the Court’s (and thus that of the Member States with 
whom the Court is in dialogue) constitutionalising capacity at the expense 
of the autonomous sub-fields of international society.52 This process is 
49 See Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered Con-
stitutional Theory’ in Christian Jeorges and Inger-Johanne Sand (eds), Transnational Gov-
ernance and Constitutionalism (Hart 2004);  and Teubner and Fischer-Lescano  (n 45). 
50 Teubner (2004) (n 49) 5: ‘The constitution of world society comes about not exclusively 
in the representative institutions of international politics, nor can it take place in a unitary 
global constitution overlying all areas of society, but emerges incrementally in the constitu-
tionalisation of a multiplicity of autonomous subsystems of world society’.
51 Of course, there are a variety of political theory arguments one could produce in support 
of this model, perhaps founded primarily on its comparative democratic, or other, legiti-
macy (see A Follesdal, JK Schaffer and G Ulfstein (eds), The Legitimacy of International Hu-
man Rights Regimes: Legal, Political and Philosophical Perspectives (CUP 2015) for various 
attempts to develop legitimising arguments in this context). The purpose of this section is 
merely to suggest that the triumph of one model is accompanied by costs and benefits that 
ought to be assessed, not taken as a base-line presumption. 
52 Teubner (n 49) provides the example of internet freedom, which he supports with this 
striking quote from the Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace: ‘Governments of the In-
dustrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel... the global social space we are building 
to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on use. You have no moral 
right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear’. 
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facilitated by certain essential features of human rights adjudication in 
the Convention context: the substantive minimalism of the rights in the 
treaty text, making them flexible tools for advocates to apply to a broad 
variety of situations; the Court’s ‘living instrument’ approach, whereby it 
interprets the Convention in light of modern day circumstances to con-
stantly expand the scope of its protection; the doctrine of ‘horizontal ef-
fect’, whereby Convention rights can impose obligations on private actors 
governing their interactions with one another; and the  possibility of the 
Court interpreting a Convention right as entailing a ‘positive obligation’ 
for States to bring about conditions for its realisation.53
We can see examples of this clash in innovative, autonomous spheres 
of the international economic and commercial order, such as internation-
al commercial arbitration.54  To imagine how a clash might occur in this 
context, suppose that in a domestic court in a Convention state an advo-
cate raises the article 6 argument that some aspect of an arbitration de-
prived the client of the right to a fair trial.55 Suppose the matter proceeds 
53 The ‘living instrument’ approach is analysed in Letsas (n 13). An example of the ‘horizon-
tal effect’ of Convention rights can be seen in the UK in cases such as Campbell v MGN (per 
Baroness Hale, paras 132-135), where art 8 jurisprudence from the European Court led to 
the development of a general tort of invasion of privacy in English law, thus affecting the 
rules that govern the extent to which a group of private actors (the press) could regulate it-
self (Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22). An example of the Court recognising the ‘positive ob-
ligations’ on Member States to develop their laws so as to generate better conditions for the 
protection of Convention rights can be found in the art 9 (freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion) jurisprudence. See Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations Under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Handbook no 7, 2007) <www.
echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRHAND/DG2-EN-HRHAND-07(2007).pdf> accessed 30 
May 2016. 
54 International commercial arbitration is a dispute mechanism premised around the 
ideas of party autonomy. Insofar as possible, it is supposed to sit outside the context of 
nation-state regulation, so as to avoid litigants being disadvantaged by the imposition of 
foreign laws in cross-border disputes: see Tibor Varady, John J Barcello III and Arthur T 
Von Mehren, International Commercial Arbitration: A Transnational Perspective (5th ed, West 
2012) 2.   
55 There are multiple examples of this occurring, both in the context of the enforcement of 
arbitration awards and irregularities in the arbitration proceeding itself. See, for example, 
Regent Company v Ukraine App no 773/0 (ECtHR 2008) where Ukraine was held to have vi-
olated art 6 by refusing to enforce an arbitral award; Stran Greek Refineries v Greece (1995) 
19 EHRR 293, where legislation retroactively invalidating an arbitration award was found to 
be a breach of art 6; and in a recent Paris Court of Appeal case, where the Court held that 
arbitral tribunals are not exempt from applying the right of access to justice, as delimited 
by art 6 and the Convention jurisprudence: see Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] 
Paris, 1e ch, 17 Nov 2011, no 09/24158, quoted in Jaroslav Kudrna, ‘Arbitration and Right 
of Access to Justice: Tips for a Successful Marriage’ (2013) New York University Journal 
of International Law Online Forum <http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
Jaroslav-Kudrna-Arbitration-and-Right-of-Access-to-Justice-NYU-JILP-Feb-2013.pdf> ac-
cessed 30 May 2016. There, examples suggest that whilst the European Court can con-
strain States’ ability to interfere with the arbitration process via prevention of enforcement, 
at the same time it can use art 6 to interfere with that independence by increasing their 
power to regulate the conduct of arbitral proceedings. 
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to the European Court, and the bench is persuaded by the argument. The 
Court then generates case law about the circumstances in which that as-
pect of international commercial arbitration proceedings breaches article 
6. This jurisprudence then filters down into the national legal orders, not 
just in the respondent State, but through the Convention system at large, 
and has a constitutionalising effect that impinges upon the autonomy of 
the field of international commercial arbitration. 
Thus the political stakes in international human rights adjudica-
tion can be described as capture of the constitutionalisation process. 
This is an aspect of the politics that is often missed, as for practitioners 
and theorists working from within the field of human rights it is hard to 
identify the framing of an issue as a human rights one as political at all. 
Yet the politics lie in the fact that it shifts power to certain institutions 
(both the European Court itself and the public institutions of the Member 
States), and towards those groups that might be better able to mobilise 
its architecture in pursuit of their own interests.56 And this capture takes 
a stake in the unfolding process of international constitutionalisation, by 
favouring the traditional nation-state model over new approaches such 
as ‘systems theory’ and ‘societal constitutionalism’, which recognise the 
legitimacy of autonomous, transnational groups in generating constitu-
tional norms outside that context. What role, then, does the margin of 
appreciation play in this? If this is a key aspect of the politics of inter-
national human rights, does the margin favour one path of international 
constitutionalisation, or is it a neutral tool, the effects of which depend 
upon the particular circumstances?
One prima facie response might be to regard the margin as a means 
of limiting the Court’s jurisdiction. The identification of the margin of ap-
preciation with other doctrines of deference, and the justification based 
on the relative ‘expertise’ of the State body, suggest that we ought to re-
gard its effect as imposing a limitation on the constitutionalising capac-
ity of human rights.57 However, further consideration suggests that its 
56 The ability of NGOs to mobilise the institutional architecture of the European Court of 
Human Rights has been analysed in detail by Rachel Cichowski, in ‘Civil Society and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in Jonas Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen (eds), 
The European Court of Human Rights: Between Law and Politics (OUP 2011). Most striking 
is her finding that there is a ‘mobilization-litigation’ dynamic that has led NGOs to increase 
their capacity to mobilise the European Court of Human Rights to pursue their social policy 
goals, suggesting the possibility of capture of the Court itself by groups best able to use 
it. It is also worth commenting that these groups may not be equally distributed across 
the Member States, suggesting that states with more developed civil society organisations 
might exert greater control over the development of European human rights jurisprudence 
than States with less strong civil society traditions. 
57 See Legg (n 12) ch 6 for an analysis of the expertise justification, suggesting that the 
greater expertise of national decision-makers is a less controversial factor for the Court to 
take into account when deciding whether to grant the state a wide margin of appreciation. 
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governance effect is more nuanced. For when the Court grants the State 
a wide margin of appreciation, it does not rule that it has no jurisdiction 
over the substantive matter. Indeed, the other institutional characteris-
tics outlined above (the minimalist nature of human rights norms, and 
the Court’s ‘living instrument’ interpretive approach) suggest a phenom-
enon of ever increasing scope of application. What tools, then, does the 
Court have to limit this expansion of its capacity? The margin of appre-
ciation is not such a tool, as the effect of a wide margin is not to render 
the issue one outside the scope of human rights. Rather, even when the 
Court defers to the Member State, it resolves the issue decisively in favour 
of the State’s interpretation of its human rights obligations vis-à-vis the 
substantive issue. It has a legal effect, and generates human rights case 
law around the substantive issue that can be used by future litigants to 
expand or limit the scope of the right, thus reverting constitutionalising 
capacity over the underlying field back to the State, and exporting it to 
other Member States via the jurisprudence of the European Court.  
As such, one way of analysing the political stakes involved in inter-
national human rights adjudication is by assessing the costs and benefits 
of framing an issue as a human rights issue, in light of different potential 
paths of constitutionalisation. The margin of appreciation is not neutral 
in this conflict, but takes a stake, by reverting constitutionalising capac-
ity back to the Member States, even where the Court grants the State a 
wide margin of appreciation. An understanding of the governance effects 
of the margin of appreciation, then, would involve a detailed examination 
of the costs and benefits of the politics of nation-state models of regula-
tion. To what extent do they impinge on the autonomy of private actors? 
Are some groups, or even states, better able to mobilise this institutional 
machinery than others? The answers to these questions might aid in as-
sessing the margin of appreciation in light of other doctrinal possibilities 
for limiting the Court’s jurisdiction, and its compatibility with other key 
aspects of the institutional and jurisprudential context, such as the re-
markable flexibility of human rights norms, and the Court’s commitment 
to interpreting the Convention as a ‘living instrument’.
3.2 The margin of appreciation and the Court’s unarticulated 
discrimination between Member States
The European Court of Human Rights has been criticised for dis-
criminating against some members by issuing harsher judgments against 
newly joined or developing States compared to the original Western Euro-
pean members from stronger liberal democratic traditions.58 The purpose 
58 See Shai Dothan, ‘Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12 
Chicago J Intl L 115, 116. Of course, this difference in treatment poses significant chal-
lenges for measurement. However, Dothan offers several different examples to support the 
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of this section is to assess the use of the margin of appreciation in light 
of this critique. It is suggested that an alternative way of thinking about 
this criticism is via the inconsistent use of the ‘consensus standard’ for 
setting the margin of appreciation. It will be argued that this inconsist-
ent use is unsurprising, as the unarticulated discrimination arises from 
a tension between the two aspects of the Court’s institutional identity 
that pull in opposite directions: the teleological claims of universal hu-
man rights, and the strong association of those claims with liberal demo-
cratic traditions, against the formal commitment to equality of Member 
States arising from the treaty-based system. The case of Hirst v United 
Kingdom (concerning restrictions on prisoners’ voting rights) is provided 
as an example of how this institutional conflict poses a challenge for the 
margin of appreciation, and led to an application of it that has attracted 
much criticism.59 It is argued that the strange result in this case can be 
explained by the Court’s unarticulated discrimination between Member 
States, and its preference for the practice of States from strong liberal 
democratic traditions. 
As mentioned above, the Court’s finding that there is a presence 
or absence of European consensus on a particular practice can be the 
claim of differing treatment. He compares the Court’s behaviour towards Russia and Eng-
land, arguing that the Court has mounted an ‘extended campaign’ against Russia regarding 
its military operations in Chechnya, involving over one hundred judgments issued against 
the State. By contrast, he suggests that when the Court’s judgment in Osman v United 
Kingdom attracted harsh academic criticism (including from leading human rights scholar 
Conor Gearty) the Court retreated from its former position in a subsequent judgment, Z and 
Others v United Kingdom (see Dothan, ibid, 136-137). He also compares the treatment of 
Ireland and Greece in the Court’s analysis of the grounds for derogating from the Conven-
tion in times of national emergency, arguing that in Lawless v Ireland the State was granted 
a wide margin of appreciation, yet in The Greek Case, the margin was narrow (Dothan, ibid, 
138). A final example concerns the difference in treatment regarding the Court’s jurisdic-
tion, where he contrasts Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others, a case in which the 
Court interpreted its jurisdiction narrowly to find no violation of the Convention where the 
claim was brought against seventeen NATO members for civilian deaths during airstrikes, 
with analogous cases where the Court gave a contrary finding of jurisdiction against Turkey 
and Moldova as respondent States (see Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) and Ilascu 
v Moldova and Russia, Dothan, ibid, 139-140). 
59 The strongest criticism can be found in the five-judge dissent. In Judge Costa’s separate 
opinion, he suggests that the majority’s use of the margin of appreciation embodies a fun-
damental confusion, in granting the State a very wide margin of appreciation following its 
analysis of State practice, yet ultimately concluding that the State was in breach: ‘However, 
once I had rejected that approach and accepted that the States have a very wide margin of 
appreciation to decide on the aims of any restriction, limitation or even outright ban on the 
right to vote… how could I, without being inconsistent, reduce that margin when it came to 
assessing the proportionality of the measure restricting universal suffrage (a concept which, 
of course, remains the democratic ideal)?’ Hirst v United Kingdom (n 22), dissenting opinion 
of Judge Costa, at 5. It is worth noting that some commentators have welcomed the Court’s 
judgment, as an indication that it is no longer considering itself to be bound by consensus 
(see George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(OUP 2009). 
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decisive moment in many cases. This is because a finding of an absence 
of consensus leads to a wide margin of appreciation, which has almost 
invariably resulted in a victory for the State. Given this, it is striking that 
the Court has failed to develop systematic principles for its assessment of 
State practice to underpin the consensus justification. The reconceptu-
alisation of the margin of appreciation as a tool suggests that the absence 
of a clear theoretical framework might offer the Court greater flexibility in 
using the margin to resolve a dispute decisively. However, this absence 
of principled bases might also be understood in another way: as the ex-
pression of an unarticulated, though fundamental, aspect of the Court’s 
institutional identity via a preference for the practice of some States over 
that of others.  
Although the margin of appreciation and the consensus justification 
appear to reflect the commitment to the formal equality of the Member 
States that underpins the treaty-based origins of the Convention system, 
in practice this is not the reality. This is apparent from judgments such 
as Hirst v United Kingdom. In that case, the Court found that the UK had 
breached Article 3 Protocol 1 of the Convention (the right to free elec-
tions) by automatically removing the right to vote from prisoners. That 
the majority judgment attracted a five-judge dissent and troubled many 
commentators arises from the fact that its use of the margin of apprecia-
tion took a novel form.
The respondent State raised the argument that the State’s margin 
of appreciation was very wide in the sphere of electoral arrangements, 
and cited numerous other cases in which the Court had recognised this. 
It then argued that the particular practice in question (automatic dis-
enfranchisement) was not contrary to European consensus, and in fact 
was supported by the practice of many other States. According to the UK 
Government’s survey, eighteen States allowed prisoners to vote without 
restriction, but in twenty-five others the right was restricted in some way, 
including thirteen who shared the UK’s practice of automatically disen-
franchising all prisoners. 60 The Divisional Court in the UK proceedings 
found that eight Convention States imposed greater restrictions on the 
right than the UK (either by barring from democratic participation for 
60 See Hirst v United Kingdom (n 22) para 33: ‘According to the Government’s survey based 
on information obtained from its diplomatic representation, eighteen countries allowed 
prisoners to vote without restriction (Albania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Germany, Iceland, Lithu-
ania, Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Ukraine), in thirteen countries all prisoners were barred from voting or unable to vote 
(Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Turkey and the United Kingdom), while in twelve countries prisoners’ right to vote 
could be limited in some other way (Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania and Spain)’. 
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life or after parole for certain offences).61 As such, it was not open to the 
Court to find that there was a European consensus prohibiting disen-
franchisement, and so it held that the State was granted a wide margin 
of appreciation. Notwithstanding this, the Court found that the UK had 
breached its obligations by adding a novel formulation to its determina-
tion of the margin of appreciation: that although it was very wide, it was 
not ‘all embracing’, and in the circumstances the UK’s legislative meas-
ure constituted a breach of its obligations under the Convention.62
This approach was described in Judge Costa’s dissent as ‘depriv-
ing the state of all margin and all means of appreciation’.63 Yet it is not 
surprising that attempts to ground the margin of appreciation on the 
idea of European consensus led the Court into difficulties in this case. 
For although the UK’s impugned practice of disenfranchising prisoners 
found support in the State practice of other members, this constituted a 
rare occasion in which the UK, a Western European State with a strong 
record for liberal democracy and human rights protection, found itself in 
a coalition of States with weaker reputations, including three of the four 
States responsible for more than half of the claims brought before the 
Court: Russia, Italy and Turkey.64 
Thus the case represents an instance in which the two institution-
al commitments of the Court pulled in opposite directions, leading to a 
novel and controversial use of the margin of appreciation. The tension 
arises from the governance dilemma of seeking to secure universal hu-
man rights through transnational adjudication in the context of a system 
of voluntary participation of formally sovereign Member States. Seen this 
way, the difficulties in using State practice as a criterion for setting the 
margin of appreciation that can been seen in the Hirst judgment are obvi-
61 ibid, para 15. 
62 ibid, para 82: ‘Therefore, while the Court reiterates that the margin of appreciation is 
wide, it is not all-embracing’. 
63 ibid, dissenting opinion of Judge Costa, para 9: ‘The point is that one must avoid confus-
ing the ideal to be attained and which I support – which is to make every effort to bring the 
isolation of convicted prisoners to an end, even when they have been convicted of the most 
serious crimes, and to prepare for their reintegration into society and citizenship – and the 
reality of Hirst (No 2), which on the one hand theoretically asserts a wide margin of appre-
ciation for the States as to the conditions in which a subjective right (derived from judicial 
interpretation) may be exercised, but goes on to hold that there has been a violation of that 
right, thereby depriving the State of all margin and all means of appreciation’. 
64 Bellamy provides some useful statistics highlighting the contrast between the UK and 
other members of this coalition (see Richard Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of In-
ternational Human Rights Conventions: Political Constitutionalism and the Hirst Case’ in 
Follesdal, Schaffer and Ulfstein (n 51) 206. Since 1966, 97% of the cases brought against 
the UK have been deemed inadmissible, with only 61% of those claims admitted held to 
have involved a breach of the Convention. By contrast, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Italy 
(who also imposed restrictions on the right of prisoners to vote) together account for more 
than half the cases brought before the Court, with Russia alone responsible for 27%.  
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ous consequences of the problems in balancing these two commitments. 
Like two oarsmen propelling the boat in opposite directions, the Hirst 
judgment shows us that any attempt to resolve this difficulty by setting 
the margin of appreciation on a principled basis is bound to lead the 
Court in circles, pushed at one moment this way, at another that, caught 
between the teleology of human rights theory, and respect for the sover-
eign autonomy and equality of its members.  
One way, then, of characterising the governance effect of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, and assessing the political stakes involved in 
the use of such a tool, might be to situate it in the context of this unar-
ticulated preference for the practice of Member States from strong liberal 
democratic traditions. This might have implications for, and be informed 
by, theoretical debates about the universalist claims of human rights, 
and lead to a different assessment of whether they can be detached from 
social context, or whether they are firmly grounded in the particular vi-
sions of social order exemplified by the Western European states who 
drafted the Convention.65 It might then lead us to consider whether the 
Convention system, understood in such a way, embodies a ‘centre-periph-
ery’ dynamic, akin to that which might be seen in the European Union, 
whereby the formal commitment to equality of the legal apparatus masks 
a deep-seated and differential treatment of Member States, broadly in ac-
cordance with the geographical fault-lines between Eastern and Western 
Europe.66  We might analyse the way in which flexible tools such as the 
margin of appreciation are deployed to mask potential clashes between 
the centre of the European human rights space, and those new members 
whose societies might embody very different visions of European liberal 
democracy (or those who might not be called liberal at all).
This section started with the critique that the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has discriminated against Member States by issuing harsher 
judgments against developing liberal democracies from the ‘periphery’ 
65 Political theorist Charles Taylor argues that it is possible to detach human rights from 
their Western origin, by reinterpreting their claims at a higher level of generality, so as to 
make them compatible with non-Western forms of political communities: see Charles Tay-
lor, ‘Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights’ in The Belgrade Circle (ed), 
The Politics of Human Rights (The Belgrade Circle 1999) 101.  Michael Freeden, ‘European 
Liberalisms: An Essay in Comparative Political Thought’ (2008) 7 European Journal of Po-
litical Theory 9, explores the connection between liberalism and human rights, and argues 
that liberalism encompasses a plurality of different modes that are found geographically 
dispersed across Europe. A deeper understanding of the relationship between human rights 
and liberal democracy might assist in identifying whether the judgments of the European 
Court are but one way among many of working out the implications of the abstract rights 
contained in the Convention, and whether that way is associated with particular, culturally 
specific visions of liberalism that dominated in the twentieth century. 
66 Damjan Kukovec, ‘A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in the EU Legal Dis-
course’ (13 April 2012) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178332> accessed 30 May 2016.   
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and those established States with high reputations for liberal democracy 
and human rights from the European centre. This observation was con-
sidered in the context of the ‘consensus’ standard for setting the margin 
of appreciation, and the difficult use of the margin in the Hirst judgment 
was suggested to be an expression of this tension between the commit-
ment to formal equality of Member States, and the teleological under-
standing of human rights that sees the Convention system as a ‘process’ 
with a final destination. Finally, it was suggested that this provides a way 
of understanding the governance implications of the margin of apprecia-
tion, and that doing so might open up new ways of assessing the politics 
of the work of the European Court of Human Rights, which in turn might 
lead to a better clarification of the telos of an institution caught between 
the competing projects of an international legal order premised on the 
sovereign equality of States and the universalist claims of human rights. 
3.3  The margin of appreciation and the Court’s strategy of judicial 
encroachment
The purpose of this section is to situate the Court’s flexible use of 
the margin of appreciation tool in the context of its challenge in ensuring 
compliance.67 This is a difficulty inherent in the institutional structure of 
the Court, as its foundation in a voluntary arrangement between govern-
ments deprives it of an effective enforcement mechanism. The Conven-
tion system’s only institutional means of ensuring compliance with its 
judgments is the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which 
monitors the correction of violations by Member States.68 However, this 
procedure is less than effective, and the States responsible for the most 
findings of violations have a number of cases pending before the Commit-
tee.69 Despite this, many scholars regard the European Convention sys-
tem as very effective at ensuring compliance, suggesting that in general 
States do comply with the Court’s judgments.70 
67 Dothan (n 58) 124-125 argues that this challenge in ensuring compliance can explain 
both its differential treatment towards some Member States (those that might be described 
as ‘low reputation’) and the phenomenon of it steadily issuing costlier and costlier judg-
ments. This paper seeks to apply these insights to the specific example of the margin of 
appreciation, and hypothesises that its flexible nature means that it can be used as a tool 
to achieve both these ends.
68 See European Convention on Human Rights, art 46(2): ’The final judgment of the Court 
shall be transmitted to the Council of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution’. The 
Committee of Ministers has the power to expel a state from the Council of Europe as a sanc-
tion, but this threat has never been exercised, rending it of minimal value in generating 
compliance (Dothan (n 58) 119). 
69 For example, the following States have had the highest number of cases pending for 
more than two years: Turkey (53), Italy (31), Bulgaria (28), Romania (23), Russia (22), and 
Poland (19). See Dothan (n 58) 120, fn 14 quoting from Council of Europe, Supervision and 
Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, *66 Annual Report.    
70 See Laurence R Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supra-
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The challenge in ensuring compliance is also increased by the trend, 
alleged by some commentators, of the Court issuing costlier and costlier 
judgments.71 This trend can result in a domestic backlash, even in those 
original Member States with strong traditions of human rights protec-
tion.72 Whilst this continued compliance poses a puzzle, one way of ex-
plaining States’ willingness to comply with the Court’s judgments despite 
the absence of an effective sanction mechanism is via the reputational 
cost that non-compliance might impose on the State.73 As such, States 
can be divided into ‘high-reputation’, those for whom noncompliance im-
poses a great cost on the Court’s reputation, and ‘low-reputation’, those 
States for whom noncompliance is expected, and thus imposes little cost 
from the perspective of other States on the reputation of the Court.74 The 
suggestion, then, is that the Court, when issuing its judgments, must 
act strategically to ‘walk on the brink of noncompliance’ (ie increase the 
costliness of its judgments), by issuing the costliest judgments that it 
national Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale L J 273, 296: ‘The rate of compliance by states with 
ECHR rulings is extremely high’. 
71 See Erik Voeten, ‘The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 61 International Organization 669, 671, for the 
argument that aspiring EU members picked activist judges so as to bolster their State’s hu-
man rights credentials as a precursor to accession. 
72 For example, UK Supreme Court Justice Lord Sumption has repeatedly attacked the 
Court’s evolutive interpretive methodology as an illegitimate expansion of the scope of the 
rights contained in the Convention text: ‘It [the European Court] has over many years 
declared itself entitled to treat the Convention as what it calls a ‘living instrument’... This 
approach has transformed the Convention from the safeguard against despotism which was 
intended by the draftsmen, into a template for many aspects of the domestic legal order. It 
has involved the recognition of a large number of new rights which are not expressly to be 
found in the language of the treaty’. See Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law: The 27th Sul-
tan Azlan Shah Lecture’  (Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 2013) 7 <http://supremecourt.uk/
docs/speech-131120.pdf> accessed 30 May 2016. 
73 Dothan (n 58) 119. However, the extent of this as an explanation, for compliance is limit-
ed by the observation that different governments, depending on the domestic political costs, 
might have strong motivations to strategically fail to comply with the Court’s judgment. As 
such, the domestic political pay-off might outweigh the international reputational sanction 
arising from a failure to comply. This is easily seen in the UK context, where the failure to 
comply with the Hirst judgment since 2005 is used by the governing Conservative Party as 
a political badge of honour, and as part of a defence of British interests and sovereignty 
against the Convention system. Indeed, this is what led Prime Minister David Cameron to 
state in Parliament ‘I see no reason why prisoners should have the vote. This is not a situa-
tion that I want this country to be in. It makes my physically ill even to contemplate having 
to give the vote to anyone who is in prison’ despite the European Court already having ruled 
that automatic disenfranchisement was a breach of the UK’s obligations under the Euro-
pean Convention (see HC Deb 3 Nov 2010, vol 517, col 921). Notwithstanding this, for the 
purposes of this paper it is enough to accept, all things being equal, that the Court might 
regard its own reputation as a factor in States’ assessment of the costs of noncompliance. 
74 Dothan (n 58) 120, fn 14: ‘Low-reputation states are less expected to comply with the 
court; therefore states that have a lower rate of compliance with the court will be considered 
low reputation states’.  
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believes will be complied with by high-reputation states.75 This powerful 
observation also helps explain the potential difference in treatment of 
Member States outlined in the previous section. For, if the reputational 
cost to the Court of non-compliance from a State with a weak tradition of 
respecting human rights is low, then the Court can be expected to issue 
costlier judgments against low-reputation states than high-reputation 
states, thus providing an alternative explanation for the apparent centre-
periphery dynamic of the Court’s adjudication.76 
Seen in this context, another means the Court might employ to pur-
sue a strategy of maximising compliance could be the development of 
flexible doctrinal tools that would assist it in ‘walking on the brink of non-
compliance’. Such tools would leave the Court the scope to decide cases 
in favour of the State, thus avoiding ‘damaging confrontations’ that might 
lead to noncompliance and a subsequent decrease in the Court’s reputa-
tion.77  Thus we might regard the margin of appreciation as a governance 
tool that assists the Court in charting the difficult path between issuing 
costly judgments against respondent States, and the reputational harm it 
will suffer if strong liberal states do not comply. The flexible nature of the 
margin of appreciation, and the failure of the Court to develop clear, pre-
dictable and consistently applied justifications for its use, suggest that it 
is well suited to this task. 
Such an observation may seem counterintuitive, as the ordinary 
understanding of the margin of appreciation is that it is a doctrine of 
deference that imposes limitations on the expansion of the Court’s juris-
diction. Yet, as suggested above, it would be inaccurate to conceptualise 
the margin of appreciation as a per se limitation on jurisdiction. Indeed, 
rather than issue a statement of law holding that the substantive matter 
is outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction as, say, a ‘political ques-
tion’ doctrine, or a dismissal of an application as ‘manifestly ill founded’ 
might, even a determination that the State’s margin of appreciation is 
75 ibid 126, ‘The Court will try to walk on the brink of noncompliance, issuing the most 
demanding judgments that it expects will lead to compliance, while still maintaining a 
small risk of noncompliance because of the inherent uncertainty of the state’s costs. As the 
court’s reputation grows, it can demand more in its judgments while still expecting compli-
ance and maintaining only the small irreducible risk of noncompliance. In order to continue 
to walk on the brink of noncompliance, the court must increase the demands of its judg-
ments as its reputation grows’. 
76 Of course, one can contest the assumption that the Court as an institution seeks to 
maximise the costliness of its judgments in the manner that critics suggest. Yet even if 
individual judges differ in their attitudes as to the proper scope of the Convention, or the 
balance between activism and restraint, the flexibility of human rights norms, and the way 
the margin of appreciation fails to prevent the capture of substantive issues as human 
rights issues suggests that there are institutional qualities that have facilitated the gradual 
expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction, notwithstanding the possibility of opposition from 
individual judges. 
77 Council of Europe (n 1). 
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very wide recognises that the issue is one that engages Convention rights, 
thus leaving scope for the Court to apply the margin differently in future 
cases, or reduce it altogether in light of an evolutive interpretation of the 
Convention.
This understanding might lead to a new way of contextualising some 
of the Court’s case law. For example, the Hirst judgment can be seen as 
an instance in which the Court was caught between the two elements of 
its institutional identity that pulled in opposite directions: its consensus-
based jurisprudence, that led to the UK being granted a very wide margin 
of appreciation, set against the teleological assumptions of human rights 
that suggested that the practice of the low-reputation States with whom 
the UK formed a coalition ought to be disregarded. In this particular in-
stance, the desire to secure a finding against the UK triumphed over the 
countervailing interest in legal certainty from consistency with its former 
decisions, and the search for a principled justification for the margin of 
appreciation based on European consensus. Principle gave way to flex-
ibility in the judicial calculation (although the five-judge dissent suggests 
it was closely fought), but the UK’s continuing non-compliance suggests 
that the Court might be expected to resolve such a conflict differently in 
future cases so as to avoid further loss to its reputation from the noncom-
pliance of a high-reputation state like the UK.78 
The explanation of the margin of appreciation found on the Council 
of Europe’s website as giving the Court the ‘flexibility needed to avoid 
damaging confrontations between the Court and the Member States’ 
supports this conceptualisation of it as a legal-diplomatic tool, which is 
sometimes used for maximising compliance. As such, an analysis of its 
governance effects, seen in this light, would have to weigh the potential 
benefits of such a flexible tool in generating compliance against the costs 
that might ensue in legitimacy, via the unequal treatment of different 
Member States, depending on how the prospects of compliance are per-
78 This conceptualisation of the margin of appreciation as a ‘legal-diplomatic tool’, assisting 
the Court in its attempt to maximise compliance while issuing costlier judgments, seems 
plausible in light of the development of margin of appreciation jurisprudence. For example, 
in Handyside, the UK was granted a wide margin of appreciation in invoking the public 
morals exception that led to a finding of no breach. However, two years later in 1981, the 
Court found against the UK in Dudgeon, arguing that criminalisation of certain homosexual 
acts was contrary to a developing European consensus, and thus warranted a narrow mar-
gin of appreciation, despite the State relying on the same ‘public morals’ justification, and 
the existence of a European consensus being strongly denied in a dissenting judgment by 
Judge Zekia (six judges dissented in total): see Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 
149. One can hypothesise that the margin of appreciation might have been developed in 
the early days as a tool to generate compliance respect, which is cashed in at crucial mo-
ments when the Court thinks the stakes are sufficiently high (such as decriminalisation of 
homosexuality) yet not in other cases (such as Handyside, concerning restrictions on the 
publication of a book) where the substantive issue does not warrant the risk of possible 
noncompliance. 
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ceived by the Court.79 This in turn might lead to a new understanding of 
what the margin of appreciation tells us about the balance of power be-
tween the two conflicting aspects of the Court’s identity, accompanied by 
a subtle shift in rhetoric. For rather than the margin of appreciation being 
the space that the Court grants to the Member States, instead we might 
regard it as something more nuanced: a prima facie acceptance by the 
Court of the limitations on its governance power inherent in its structure, 
yet at the same time a flexible tool that provides the means to decrease, 
if not permanently transcend, those limitations. Whether or not there are 
other doctrinal moves that can resolve this tension without the cost that 
flexibility imposes on legitimacy, and how we might begin to think about 
those in political terms, will be considered in the final section. 
4 Judicial rulership and the politics of separation of powers
The purpose of this final section is to draw together the interpreta-
tions of the governance effects of the margin of appreciation offered in 
sketch form above, by attempting to situate the European Court of Hu-
man Rights as an institution of global governance closely associated with 
a particular period of legal thought, involving widespread judicialisation 
of constitutional and human rights norms.80  The aim is to consider what 
impact this contextualisation of the Court has on these interpretations 
of the margin of appreciation, and whether an enhanced consciousness 
of this context might open up new possibilities for the Court’s jurispru-
dence, which might in turn have an impact on the exercise of its govern-
ance power. 81 It is suggested that the use of the margin of appreciation 
as an ‘escape valve’ to avoid relying on the Court’s own proportionality 
assessments involves a kind of Sartrean ‘bad faith’, as doing so disguises 
an implicit ranking of interests, yet has an equivalent governance ef-
fect. An enhanced consciousness of this understanding of the margin’s 
79 This picture might also lead us to new ways of analysing the work of particular judges on 
the Court, for example as the distinction between ‘activist’ and ‘conservative’ judges would 
be complicated by the fact that the margin can be wielded as a short-term strategic tool for 
generating compliance respect by granting the state a wide margin of appreciation.
80 This section follows Duncan Kennedy’s tripartite periodisation of legal thought into 
‘Classical Legal Thought’, ‘Social Legal Thought’ and ‘Contemporary Legal Thought’, each of 
which is characterised by different dominant methodologies, legal philosophies and govern-
ance ideas. See Duncan Kennedy, ‘Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968’ 
(2002) 36 Suffolk University Law Review 631, 632. 
81 The idea that an enhanced consciousness of governance power might lead to more re-
sponsible exercises of that power follows David Kennedy’s suggestion. In several papers, he 
calls for an ‘enhanced consciousness of rulership’ among human rights activists, arguing 
that ‘ambivalent rulership is often rulership denied’ (see David Kennedy, ‘The International 
Human Rights Regime: Still Part of the Problem?’ in Dickinson and others (n 17) 23), and 
among experts participating in global governance, yet in a state of denial about their gov-
ernance power (see Kennedy (n 45)). This section seeks to apply this insight to judges in the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
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governance implications might lead the Court to place greater emphasis 
on its own proportionality and balancing analyses, which in turn would 
require a renewed focus on the ‘politics of the separation of powers’, and 
the Court’s legitimacy. 
4.1 The European Court of Human Rights in contemporary legal 
thought
Kennedy offers a tripartite periodisation of law and legal thought, 
tracing its development from ‘Classical Legal Thought’, through ‘Social 
Legal Thought’, to ‘Contemporary Legal Thought’, the current paradigm. 
None of these paradigms is supposed to be exclusionary, in the sense 
that each represents a body of techniques that can emerge to a greater 
or lesser extent in each period. The purpose of the periodisation is simply 
to identify certain legal tropes that have dominated in particular periods, 
as part of a complex process of reaction and counter-reaction. As such, 
‘Contemporary Legal Thought’ is characterised by the following key fea-
tures: a legal core centred on constitutional law, ‘rights and policies’ as 
a dominant normative idea, conventions and constitutions as key legal 
instruments, the balancing of conflicting interests as a dominant mode of 
analysis, and the relationship between law and politics as a fundamental 
problem.82  
Another way of characterising the features of this paradigm might be 
as involving ‘the adaption of law to the rationality of politics’.83 As such, 
law, both in terms of its methodology and promise, could be understood 
as political in the Weberian sense: a domain in which different values 
clash, with no way of maximising them all simultaneously, and the role 
of politics (now law) is to choose between which to prioritise in a given 
context, at the expense of which others.84  That law might incorporate 
this rationality can be explained as the consequence of the juridification 
of social life through the growth of the administrative state, the judi-
cialisation of that juridified regime, and the subsequent shift of power to 
constitutional law (and thus constitutional lawyers and judges) that ac-
companies constitutionalisation.85 
82 Kennedy (n 80) 632. 
83 See Teubner (n 49) 21: ‘...constitutional law has liberated the intrinsic logic of politics 
by “politicising” the law itself: teleological interpretation, policy orientation, balancing of 
interests, impact assessment and result-orientation are indicators of an adaptation of law 
to the rationality of politics’. 
84 See Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in P Lassman and R Spears (eds), Weber: Political 
Writings (CUP 2003). 
85 See Duncan Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000’ in 
David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law And Economic Development: A Criti-
cal Appraisal  (CUP 2006) 
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A key feature of Contemporary Legal Thought, then, involves the ex-
plicit application of proportionality and balancing analyses to provide the 
final resolution of legal problems. For Kennedy, these techniques emerge 
as a ‘last resort’, when the legal materials fail to point to a particular 
solution that can be presented as legally necessary. However, the charac-
terisation of proportionality and balancing analyses as last resorts seems 
at odds with the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, and 
suggests it might present a special case. This is because, for a Court in 
which the basic legal materials are a Convention text that contains a 
schedule of rights, with no clear hierarchy, it is unsurprising that the 
clash of those rights and interests that can be seen in every case would 
be resolved through explicit applications of proportionality and balancing 
of interests. The success and expansion of the European Court of Human 
Rights, then, might be seen as the apotheosis of this process, facilitated 
by the flexible qualities of human rights that make them apt tools for 
constitutionalisation, even in States traditionally hostile to constitutional 
review via human rights.86
As such, seen in this context, the European Court of Human Rights 
takes on a new aspect: as the institutional embodiment of Contemporary 
Legal Thought, and its embracing of the collapse between law and poli-
tics as separate domains, accompanied by the growing dependence on 
proportionality and balancing of interests as methods of resolving the 
cases before it. This fusion of law and politics in a heuristic that offers 
the potential resolution of any political problem is in keeping with both 
critiques of human rights that historicise human rights as the current 
dominating universalist ideology, and the triumphalism that can be seen 
sometimes in the Court’s self-image, for example in descriptions of the 
Court as the ‘crowning achievement… perhaps in the history of all law’.87 
86 Tom Hickman, Public Law After the Human Rights Act (Hart 2010) 1 provides an overview 
of the way in which human rights principles have ‘transformed public law in the United 
Kingdom’, both before and after the formal incorporation of the European Convention into 
domestic law in 1998. Hickman describes the effect of human rights as in the UK as involv-
ing the ‘reconfiguration of public law so that modern civil and political rights and freedoms, 
as set out in post-war international human rights instruments, are at its core and radiate 
even into areas seemingly distant from human rights concerns, such as planning disputes, 
taxation and hunting with hounds, to name but a very few’. 
87 See, for example, Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (HUP 2010), for a historical critique of 
the teleological tendency of human rights theorists and supporters to trace their origins to 
the beginning of time, instead suggesting that human rights as the dominant universalist 
project of today only achieved its current form in the 1970s, facilitated by the collapse of 
other ideological universalist projects. That the Court itself embraces the utopianism of 
human rights can be seen from statements such as the following, by Michael O’Boyle, the 
Court’s Deputy Registrar, describing the Court as  ‘one of the major developments in Euro-
pean legal history and the crowning achievement of the Council of Europe. The emergence 
of the authority of the European Court of Human Rights has been described as one of the 
most remarkable phenomena in the history of international law, perhaps in the history of 
all law’ (see Anthony Lester, ‘The European Court of Human Rights after Fifty Years’ in 
Christoffersen and Madsen (n 56) 98.
111CYELP 12 [2016] 81-118
But if we accept this contextualisation of the European Court as the in-
stitutional apotheosis of contemporary legal thought in a transnational 
context, what bearing does this have on our understanding of the margin 
of appreciation? What impact might a greater understanding of this have 
on its judges, and their approach to this tool?
4.2 Judicial rulership and the margin of appreciation
One possibility is that a greater consciousness of the methodology of 
Contemporary Legal Thought might have an emancipatory effect, lessen-
ing the Court’s dependence on the margin. The relationship between the 
margin of appreciation, proportionality and balancing is complex.88 Not-
withstanding this, the Court has attracted criticism from practitioners for 
using the margin of appreciation as a tool to avoid having to undertake 
its own detailed proportionality and balancing assessments.89 As such, 
this institutional context makes the development of a tool such as the 
margin all the more curious, and seemingly at odds with the zeitgeist of 
Contemporary Legal Thought, as expressed in the European Court via 
the utopianism of transnational human rights.   
For if the dominant characteristic of legal reasoning in this period, 
in keeping with the ‘adaptation of law to the rationality of politics’, is the 
emphasis on conflicting considerations, and a style of reasoning that re-
solves legal questions through proportionality and balancing analyses, 
then that these legal techniques should emerge as a key feature of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is unsurprising. 
Contra domestic courts, its dependence on a human rights treaty sug-
gests that the solutions to all its legal questions will be expressed explic-
88 For example, Legg (n 12) 177 argues that proportionality analysis and the margin of 
appreciation are mutually constitutive of a comprehensive theory of human rights adjudi-
cation. Others argue that proportionality and balancing pose a threat to the very concept 
of human rights: see, for example, Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Hu-
man Rights?’  (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468. For the purposes 
of this paper, it is not necessary to engage in great detail with these complex theoretical 
questions about the relationship between these concepts. However, it is suggested that it 
is unhelpful to posit a necessary connection between the margin of appreciation and pro-
portionality analysis, and in fact the historical origins of both suggest that they ought to be 
seen as contingent doctrinal choices that push in different directions. This is evident when 
one considers the historical genealogy of proportionality, which suggests its emergence 
posed a challenge to the doctrinal precursors of the margin of appreciation, by providing a 
rational basis for the expansion of judicial power. See Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Matthews, 
‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 72, 78: ‘In most Continental systems, like France and Italy, courts used, 
pre-proportionality, various standards, including “manifest error of appreciation” (granting 
very wide deference)...’. 
89 See Lester (n 87) 102: ‘The problem with the Court’s loose invocation of the margin of 
appreciation is that it removes the need for the Court to discern and explain the criteria 
appropriate to particular problems. What is needed is a careful, skillful, and consistent ap-
plication of the principle of proportionality’. 
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itly in terms of proportionality and balancing.90 The majority, if not all, of 
its cases can only be resolved by the Court deciding that one particular 
right, or interest qua permitted exception to a right, was more impor-
tant in a given context. This moment of decision, which is rationalised 
through proportionality and balancing analyses, is thus a fundamental 
and inescapable aspect of a Court premised on human rights derived 
from a treaty-based text.91
As such, the Court’s preference for resolving disputes by using the 
margin of appreciation to defer to the Member States’ own proportionality 
assessments, suggests a ‘flight from rulership’, and an unwillingness to 
embrace this fundamental aspect of the Court’s governance function. The 
margin, then, might be characterised as an ‘escape valve’ that the Court 
uses to avoid it having to take a stand in substantive issues of policy, and 
grasp the difficult task of deciding, where the legal materials necessarily 
cannot point to a particular conclusion. 
Of course, it might be argued that the development of a tool to avoid 
particularly ‘damaging confrontations’ with the Member States is neces-
sary, given the treaty-based origins of the system. Yet even if this were 
justified as a means of retaining the States’ consent to participate in the 
system, then, it is suggested, this would still involve a kind of Sartrean 
‘bad faith’.92 For not only would the judgments fail to reflect the real rea-
sons for the margin of appreciation being applied, but its use would still 
involve the very ranking of interests that the Court might seek to avoid 
through using it. The decision that a particular case is sufficiently contro-
versial to justify the use of the margin itself involves an implicit ranking 
90 Some legal sceptics might suggest that all judicial decisions, in whatever field, ultimately 
reduce to the application of principles similar to proportionality and balancing. Whether or 
not this is the case, the European Court of Human Rights is surely unique in its depend-
ence on these techniques as the dominant and explicit ways of rationalising its decision-
making process. 
91 Stone Sweet and Matthews (n 88) 78 argue that proportionality emerged precisely as a 
means of protecting judicial decisions over constitutional matters from attacks on legiti-
macy. As a legal technique, then, it offers a way of rationalising a given policy decision in a 
judicial context: ‘[proportionality analysis] does not camouflage judicial lawmaking. Prop-
erly employed, it requires courts to acknowledge and defend – honestly and openly – the 
policy choices they make when they make constitutional choices…. not a magic wand that 
judges wave to make all of the political dilemmas of rights review disappear. Indeed, waving 
it will expose rights adjudication for what it is: constitutionally-based lawmaking’. 
92 ‘Bad faith’ is taken to mean a self-deception about the necessity of acting in a certain 
way, and as such implies a denial of freedom, and the responsibility inherent in making a 
particular choice, referred to above as a ‘flight from rulership’. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being 
and Nothingness (first published 1943, Citadel Press 2001) 448: ‘It should be observed first 
of all that the choice of total ends although totally free is not necessarily nor even frequently 
made in joy. We must not confuse our necessity of choosing with the will to power. The 
choice can be effected in resignation or uneasiness; it can be a flight; it can be realized in 
bad faith. We can choose ourselves as fleeing, as inapprehensible, as indecisive, etc. We can 
even choose not to choose ourselves…’ (emphasis added). 
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of interests, as does the decision to accept the State’s arguments that 
some issues fall under the ‘public morals’ exception, and others do not. 
At the same time, granting the State a wide margin of appreciation 
still entails the significant exercise of governance power: for it resolves 
the issue decisively in favour of one party, and has the same legal effect 
in the respondent State, and throughout the Convention system, via the 
Court’s jurisprudence. To deny this aspect of the Court’s rulership is to 
ignore the governance power it wields when it uses the margin of ap-
preciation, and suggests a flight from its governance function, perhaps 
motivated by a fear about its competence or ability to generate compli-
ance, were it to embrace more wholeheartedly the proportionality and 
balancing characteristics of contemporary legal thought, of which it is the 
ultimate expression.
4.3 The politics of separation of powers in a transnational context 
What might a greater acceptance of this aspect of the Court’s govern-
ance power entail? If its judges were to embrace the possibilities of this 
form of rulership, how might this affect our analysis of the Court, and its 
role in global governance? Of course, the natural and longstanding objec-
tions to these processes of judicialisation and constitutionalisation take 
the form of institutional competence and legitimacy arguments, which 
contend that courts are inappropriate institutions for the exercise of this 
governance function. Indeed, such objections have spawned an entire 
discourse in the particular context of the European Court, as theorists 
search for different ways to legitimate the project of transnational adjudi-
cation of human rights.93 Yet the analysis of the political stakes inherent 
in the Court’s use of the margin of appreciation doctrine outlined in this 
paper suggest that its continued use might also pose challenges to the 
Court’s legitimacy. Its flexible use, and the way it gives the illusion of the 
Court avoiding taking a stand on the underlying substantive issue, whilst 
deciding the case in favour of the State, alongside the differential treat-
ment of Member States, suggests that the margin of appreciation itself 
might pose significant challenges to the long-term legitimacy of the Court 
that ought to play a part in our assessment.94 
93 See Follesdal and others (n 51) for a variety of approaches to considering legitimacy in 
this context. 
94 Indeed, there is no suggestion that the consent of the Member States at present poses 
a threat to the system, despite the fact that the Court has issued increasingly costly judg-
ments against Member States in a process of continual expansion. Through the Protocols, 
the States have added new rights, expanding the Court’s governance capacity. Moreover, at 
the 2012 Brighton Conference, the suggestion that art 35 ought to be amended to include 
the margin of appreciation was rejected (instead, a reference to the margin of appreciation 
will now appear in the Preamble). See Spielmann (n 50) 383. 
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One might then seek to respond to these institutional competence 
arguments with novel justifications that situate the Court as an institu-
tion of global governance, perhaps through the argument that separation 
of powers in a transnational context requires not necessarily the differ-
entiation of governance functions per se, but rather institutional differ-
entiation over the same governance functions.95 A greater understanding 
of these sets of arguments might free the Court from concerns about set-
tling issues decisively using its own balancing and proportionality analy-
ses, as, rather than intruding on the rightful function of domestic govern-
ance institutions, the Court would instead be participating in a process of 
mutual interaction, whereby the fallibility of either institution to ensure 
the effective protection of human rights is checked by the participation of 
the Court in the same process.
Yet while this might provide judges and scholars with the argumen-
tative tools to lessen dependence on the margin of appreciation, a deep 
analysis of the stakes involved in such an empowered court would be re-
quired – a ‘politics of the separation of powers’, understood in the context 
of transnational adjudication.96 This new type of analysis would have to 
be capable of identifying the stakes involved in a more forthright exercise 
of this governance function by the European Court. It would not be suf-
ficient merely to identify those stakes as a shifting of power away from 
domestic institutions towards the Court itself. Rather, there would need 
to be some way to conceptualise those stakes in substantive (not merely 
constitutional) political terms. Which groups would be advantaged or dis-
advantaged by such an empowered Court? Would some individuals or 
organisations be better able to mobilise this architecture than others? 
Does this model of developing constitutional norms tend to advantage 
particular sides in certain political conflicts more than others? What are 
the political stakes in this form of constitutionalisation?
Whilst this paper cannot provide full answers to these difficult ques-
tions, the possible interpretations of the governance effects of the margin 
of appreciation offered in sketch form above can suggest some ways of 
thinking about them. We might, for example, embrace an understand-
ing of human rights per se as an ‘ideology’ that allows us to critique its 
limitations as a mode of resolving disputes, not from within human rights 
itself, but by elaborating the boundaries of the discourse. That might, 
say, lead to an understanding of the limitations involved in a technique 
of conflict resolution that is tightly linked to the political theory of liberal-
95 Indeed, this is what is often referred to both in the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the 
scholarship as the ‘dialogue’ between the Court and domestic institutions. See Slaughter (n 
48). 
96 See Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Hermeneutics of Suspicion in Contemporary American Legal 
Thought’ (2014) 25 Law and Critique 91. 
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ism, in its Western European form. We might, in the particular context 
of the European Court of Human Rights, assess the impact on different 
political conflicts of the capture of transnational processes of constitu-
tionalisation by an institution that requires an individual to have suf-
fered harm in a particular national context, and then resolves that issue 
by generating constitutional norms that have their purchase within that 
national context, before diffusing throughout the Convention system as a 
whole. Such an analysis might lead us to consider whether the capture of 
this process by an institution sitting at the apex of the traditional nation-
state hierarchy of legislature, constitutional court, then international hu-
man rights court, solves the problems of the nation-state, or whether it 
actually enhances its limitations, pushing against the twenty-first cen-
tury sociological context of disaggregation of regulatory functions among 
a variety of transnational public and private actors. 
The politics of the separation of powers in this particular institution-
al context might also require us to take seriously critiques of the Court’s 
difference in treatment of Member States. This might lead us to conceptu-
alise the stakes in these circumstances as those suggested by the earliest 
critiques of the margin of appreciation – the tension between universality 
and pluralism, except that, rather than occurring at the abstract level of 
human rights theory, this conflict could be given a practical expression 
through an analysis of differential treatment, and the subsequent costs 
to legitimacy this might impose. We could then set this in the wider con-
text of European integration, and assess the impact of the Court on this 
process, and whether the rhetoric of human rights might be shorthand 
for a new form of civilising mission, disguising a relationship of tutelage 
between the European centre and periphery. Finally, taken as a whole, 
the phenomenon of the Court’s steady encroachment on States must it-
self have political stakes, in that its success or failure must have some 
purchase on the outcome of the conflicts that it is called upon to resolve. 
If law has adapted to the rationality of politics in the institutional setting 
of the European Court, and the Court were to embrace the techniques of 
that rationality via proportionality and balancing of interests, then this 
might require an intensity of focus on the composition of the bench, and 
the importation of tools developed in critical legal studies, starting from 
the assumption that if in such an institution law and politics are fused, 
then we ought to enhance our knowledge of who our rulers are, to better 
elucidate the politics of the separation of powers. 
In summary, the Court’s development of the margin appreciation as 
a tool is linked to its unwillingness to resolve decisively issues of political 
controversy using the contemporary legal thought methodologies of inter-
est balancing and proportionality. Yet those techniques are not merely 
expressions of the current paradigm of constitutionalisation (that alone 
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would not be an argument for their use), but are also closely connect-
ed to the Court’s identity as an institution exercising governance power 
through human rights adjudication. This institutional identity provides 
not only the possibility of substantive solutions to political conflicts, but 
also the method of their resolution, through the tools of proportionality 
and balancing of interests. That the Court has developed the capacity to 
resolve cases without relying on its own application of these tools sug-
gests a denial of its governance power, and the victory of one of our two 
oarsmen in the struggle for the Court’s identity, even as its power extends 
progressively further. This is not to suggest that judges ought to embrace 
wholeheartedly that expansion of the Court’s reach – only that a greater 
consciousness of the political stakes inherent in this kind of rulership 
might lead to a more responsible exercise of that power, including when 
it takes the form of the margin of appreciation.
5 Conclusion
This paper has argued that the margin of appreciation can be seen 
as the expression of a governance dilemma, arising from the challenge 
of judicialising the protection of human rights in a transnational con-
text. The nature of the challenge involves a clash between the competing 
claims of two twentieth-century projects of global governance: the sover-
eign equality of nation-states as the foundation of international law, and 
the universalist claims of human rights. The presentation of the margin 
of appreciation by the Council of Europe as an ‘inherent and permanent 
phenomenon’, and the search for principles on which to base its use, 
must be seen in this light. The purpose of this paper has been to chal-
lenge the rhetoric of necessity surrounding the margin of appreciation, 
and instead to recapture its contingency as a solution to this governance 
dilemma, by suggesting ways of thinking about its governance effects, 
and the political stakes that arise from the use of such a tool.  
The first part of this paper provided a brief overview of the current 
state of scholarship regarding the margin of appreciation. It was argued 
that the tendencies of the literature to either analyse the margin of appre-
ciation as a judicial doctrine or as an abstract threat to the universalism 
of human rights both failed to capture the flexible nature and governance 
implications of its use. An analysis of some of the common problems with 
justifications for deploying the margin of appreciation led to the sugges-
tion that it be reconceptualised as a ‘governance tool’. The remaining sec-
tions sought to analyse the margin in this light, providing four sketches 
of its possible governance effects.
The first such sketch placed the European Court of Human Rights 
in the context of broader processes of transnational constitutionalisation, 
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and argued that the margin of appreciation takes a stake in the conflict 
between nation-state centric and disaggregated visions of constitutionali-
sation, by capturing substantive issues as human rights issues, and re-
verting constitutionalising capacity back to the public institutions of the 
Member States. The second sketch suggested that another way of under-
standing the Court’s use of the margin of appreciation as a governance 
tool is as an aspect of the unarticulated discrimination between Member 
States. This discrimination, it was suggested, arose from the tension be-
tween the universalism of human rights, which suggested a preference 
for the practice of certain Member States, and the formal commitment to 
the sovereign equality of states arising from its treaty-based foundation. 
It was argued that this formal equality had little bearing on its practice, 
as could be seen from the Court’s inconsistent use of the consensus jus-
tification for the margin of appreciation. 
The third sketch then sought to situate the margin of appreciation in 
the context of the Court’s challenge in ensuring compliance with its judg-
ments. It was suggested that the flexibility of the margin of appreciation 
facilitates its use as a tool to aid in the Court’s strategy of jurisdiction-
al encroachment, by issuing costlier judgments against low-reputation 
States than high-reputation States, or using the margin in an ad hoc way 
to avoid suffering a reputational hit by issuing a costly judgment unlikely 
to be complied with. The final section sought to bring these other claims 
together, by offering an understanding of the margin of appreciation as 
a ‘flight from rulership’, and an attempted abnegation of the Court’s gov-
ernance power in failing to resolve certain cases using its own proportion-
ality assessments. It was suggested that this was a kind of ‘bad faith’, as 
the use of the margin of appreciation still required the Court to take a 
stake in substantive issues of interest balancing, and still involved an ex-
ercise of its governance power due to the significant legal effect in Mem-
ber States. Finally, it was argued that a greater consciousness of this 
might liberate the Court to embrace the possibilities of its rulership and 
exercise its governance power more responsibly – but that this in turn 
would lead to a renewed focus on the ‘politics of the separation of powers’ 
in a transnational setting. 
Whatever the governance effects of this judicial tool, its recent inclu-
sion in the Preamble of the Convention suggests that it is likely to remain 
a part of the Court’s jurisprudence for the foreseeable future. This paper 
has not sought to express a view on whether this consolidation of the 
margin of appreciation per se is desirable, but it has attempted to re-
move the aura of necessity surrounding it. The complicated politics of the 
margin of appreciation are closely connected to the institutional identity 
of the European Court, an identity with conflicting strands. Whether or 
not we celebrate or bemoan its continued existence ought to depend on 
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a proper assessment of its politics, however difficult such an assessment 
may be. It is hoped that these four sketches of ways of thinking about the 
governance effects of the margin of appreciation might contribute to this 
– and in so doing help distinguish between what is contingent and what 
is necessary in the European Court of Human Rights and the exercise of 
its governance power in the European constitutional space. 
